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Hargitai Tibor1
Redefining Euroscepticism Has the Netherlands 
become more Eurosceptic since 2002?
Redefi ning the understanding of Euroscepticism. Th e current categorisations of party Eu-
roscepticism are insuffi  cient in qualifying the actual positioning of parties regarding the 
diff erent dimensions of the European Union. A more refi ned approach, looking at a policy-
specifi c level, is presented that gives a better understanding of the actual position of politi-
cal parties concerning the EU, and areas which are taboos for these parties to cooperate or, 
conversely, not to cooperate. Th is fi ne-grained analysis also allows the tracing of changes 
in the positioning of these parties or government over time. In order to substantiate this, a 
qualitative content analysis of the party manifestos of the political parties in the Nether-
lands over the period 2002-2017 is conducted.
1. Introduction
Are the European Union member states becoming more Eurosceptic? Th is is a question many 
would intuitively answer in the affi  rmative. Th eir answer might be on the basis of oversimplifi ed 
statements from political leaders, or is based on the current categorisations which do not deal 
with the substantive position of political parties, but off er rather general statements on the natu-
re of support for the European Union. What this paper off ers is a scale of quantifying Euroscep-
ticism, by looking at specifi c policy areas and indicating the extent of Euroscepticism or non-
Euroscepticism. While the current study examines the Netherlands, the same framework and 
methodology may also be applied across time and space, i.e. in other member states and with a 
larger or small time horizon. Th e specifi c research question analysed in this paper is: Have politi-
cal parties the Netherlands become more Eurosceptic between 2002 and 2017? Or put in a diff erent 
way: Have Dutch political parties moved away from European cooperation and integration? 
Th e core argument of the research question has already been analysed by Harryvan and 
Hoekstra (2013), namely whether the political parties in the Netherlands have become more 
Eurosceptic, in parallel to the Dutch public’s increasingly critical position towards the EU. Th e 
time diff erence is that those authors employ the categorisation of Flood (2002) to attribute a 
level of Euroscepticism (or Europeanism) on a party-level basis. Harryvan and Hoekstra use 
this categorisation to look at the general position of parties towards the EU, and also to quantify 
the position of parties to the extent that they are in favour or disapprove of EU competences 
in the fi nancial-monetary dimension. Th e current study employs a diff erent approach towards 
this question, by creating a scale of Euroscepticism according to the concrete policy positions 
of the political parties in the Netherlands. Th e purpose of the paper is to test the conclusions 
of earlier studies of party Euroscepticism in the Netherlands by employing a diff erent model of 
evaluation. 
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Th is paper proceeds with a discussion of the concept of party Euroscepticism and off ers an 
alternative approach to the evaluation of party-based Euroscepticism. Th e next section goes into 
the methodological considerations and the criteria for the selection of the policy positions. Th en 
the results will be presented and discussed. Th e conclusion refl ects on the hypothesis and the 
benefi ts of the current approach.
2. Towards a different approach to party-based Euroscepticism
Th e EU has become a politicised issue in the domestic political debate. According to Hooghe and 
Marks (2009), since the Maastricht Treaty the EU has become more politicised as a consequence 
of its increased salience and the mobilisation of political entrepreneurs. One the other hand, 
there appears to be an incentive for mainstream parties to keep the European Union off  the 
political agenda, because the incentives to do so are missing. Two factors would facilitate the po-
liticisation, namely if an issue would lead to the prospect of electoral gains, and if the issue could 
be integrated “into the left -right structure of party competition” (Green-Pedersen, 2012: 126). 
However, Hooghe and Marks argue rather that the “giant has awakened in an era of constraining 
dissensus”, where the politicisation of the EU “escape[s] mainstream party control” (2017: 23). 
Th e political entrepreneurs Hooghe and Marks (2008) spoke of are thus the Eurosceptic parti-
es that use Eurosceptic frames for strategic, vote-seeking purposes (Abbarno and Zapryanova, 
2013: 583). An answer to this question fi rstly requires a discussion of what is meant by the term 
Euroscepticism. 
Th e current literature on defi ning party Euroscepticism focuses on categorising party parties 
on the basis of the certain dimensions of resistance to the EU. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) dis-
tinguish broadly on the basis of soft  and hard Euroscepticism; Kopecky and Mudde (2002) diff e-
rentiate between two dimensions, namely the support for European integration and for the EU 
(in general); and there are a number of more refi ned categorisations (Flood, 2002; Conti, 2003; 
Vasilopoulou, 2009; Vollaard and Voerman, 2015) that focus on some form of degree of Euro-
scepticism; while still others focus on the drivers, or motivators, of Euroscepticism (Sørensen, 
2008; Leconte, 2010; Skinner, 2012). Th e aim here is to go beyond these conceptualisations and 
empirically test whether member states have become more Eurosceptic over time or not. 
Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003) distinguish between core and periphery EU policies, but are 
dependent on subjective perceptions. Leconte clarifi es that it depends on the specifi c context, 
“whether opposition to specifi c EU policies is an expression of a broader type of Euroscepticism” 
(2010: 7). She distinguishes between four types of Euroscepticism: “utilitarian Euroscepticism, 
which expresses scepticism as to the gains derived from EU membership at individual or count-
ry level; political Euroscepticism, which illustrates concerns over the impact of European integ-
ration on national sovereignty and identity; value-based Euroscepticism, which denounces EU 
‘interference’ in normative issues; and cultural anti-Europeanism, which is rooted in a broader 
hostility towards Europea as a continent and in distrust towards the societal models and instit-
utions of European countries.” (2010: 43) Th e varieties of Euroscepticism that Leconte proposes 
do not refl ect a degree of Euroscepticism, but instead represent the underlying causes of the 
diff erent types of Euroscepticism that there exist. Th e typology off ers valuable insights into what 
causes Euroscepticism, yet do not indicate how much these diff erent varieties mean for the ove-
rall sense of Euroscepticism among a political party, or the political establishment in a country.  
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Furthermore, there are two categorisations, where some form of hierarchy in levels of Euro-
scepticism (Europeanism) is presented, that are used specifi cally in the case of the Netherlands 
of which the results are shown in table 1. Harryvan and Hoekstra (2013) use an adaptation of 
Flood’s (2002) categorisation2:
– EU-maximalist  4
– EU-positivist  2
– EU-minimalist  0 
– EU-renationalist  -2
– EU-rejectionist  -4
Th e second category is by Vollaard and Voerman (2015) and diff erentiates support for the 
EU into 4 categories: 
– Europhile parties envision a further development of a supranational union with European 
citizens. Th is does not necessarily exclude any criticism towards the EU though.
– Europragmatic parties see the national member states as the primary political actors and 
want to maintain this balance. Th ey see European integration as an instrument to serve the dom-
estic public interest and the national interests; if integration does not serve this purpose, then 
these parties might aim for less integration.
– Soft  eurosceptic parties resist deeper European integration by opposing a further sharing 
of sovereignty and extending the European free market
– Hard eurosceptic parties unequivocally oppose at least one of the core principles of the EU 
- a European free market and sharing national sovereignty
(Vollaard and Voerman 2015, 101-103)
In Table 1, the general position of the political parties in the Netherlands are categorised by 
using the typologies of Harryvan and Hoekstra by Vollaard and Voerman. Th e former selected 
the election cycles of 2002 and 2012 for their categorisation, and the latter focused on 2 defi ning 
moments in the recent history of the Netherlands; namely the shock of the 2005 ‘no’ vote in the 
referendum held in the Netherlands for the ratifi cation of the EU Constitutional Treaty, and the 
aft ermath of the 2010 debt crises across the EU (Vollaard and Voerman 2017). Th e last column 
are the labels of the present author on the basis of party manifestos for the 2017 general elections, 
according to the typology of Vollaard and Voerman.  
2 Rejectionist: positions opposed to either (i) membership of the EU or (ii) participation in some particular 
institution or policy. Revisionist: positions in favour of a return to the state of aff airs before some major 
treaty revision, either (i) in relation to the entire confi guration of the EU or (ii) in relation to one or more 
policy areas. Minimalist: positions accepting the status quo but resisting further integration either (i) of 
the entire structure or (ii) of some particular policy area(s). Gradualist: positions supporting further integ-
ration either (i) of the system as a whole or (ii) in some particular policy area(s), so long as the process is 
taken slowly and with great care. Reformist: positions of constructive engagement, emphasising the need 
to improve one or more existing institutions and/or practices. Maximalist: positions in favour of pushing 
forward with the existing process as rapidly as is practicable towards higher levels of integration either (i) 
of the overall structure or (ii) in some particular policy areas. (Chris Flood’s original categorisation, 2002)
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Between Harryvan and Hoekstra’s and Vollaard and Voerman’s results there are marked dif-
ferences. Th is could be due to the diff erent categories they employ, or their diff erent interpreta-
tions of the same content. Whereas Harryvan and Hoekstra use party manifestos as the core of 
their data analysis, Vollaard and Voerman also use parliamentary debates and news analysis. 
A notable diff erence is in the rating of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the centre-left  li-
beral party, D66. Th e former is considered to be Euro-maximalist in the case of Harryvan and 
Hoekstra, while Vollaard and Voerman rates the party Euro-pragmatic, the second ‘level’ aft er 
Europhile. In the case of D66 the diff erence is inverted; for Harryvan and Hoekstra the position 
of D66 was not Euro-maximalist but only Euro-positivist, irrespective of the fact that the D66 
in their 2002 election programme states that it favours a Federal Union. At the same time, one 
should note that the variable time is important in case of the EU, since diff erent political parties 
will react diff erently to the changes in the dynamics and events that occur in the EU. As such, the 
















50+ - - - Soft  Eurosceptic Europragmatic
CDA 4 4 Europragmatic Europragmatic Europragmatic
CU - - Europragmatic Soft  Eurosceptic Soft  Eurosceptic
DENK - - - - Europragmatic
D66 2 4 Europhile Europhile Europhile
FvD - - - - Hard Eurosceptic
GL 2 4 Europhile Europhile Europhile
LPF - - Soft  Eurosceptic - -
PvdA 3 4 Europragmatic Europragmatic ‘Soft ’ Europhile
PvdD - - Soft  Eurosceptic Soft  Eurosceptic Soft  Eurosceptic





SGP - - Soft  Eurosceptic Soft  Eurosceptic Soft  Eurosceptic
SP 0 2 Soft  Eurosceptic Soft  Eurosceptic Soft  Eurosceptic
VVD 0 2 Europragmatic Europragmatic Europragmatic
Topaloff  argues that Euroscepticism “has become a fundamental component of the political 
portfolios of the marginal parties”, which are tapping into the increased politicisation of the 
EU and “the ensuing death of permissive consensus”, thereby “carving out of a niche for them-
selves in the political spectrum” (Topaloff , 2012: 74). As such, this paper will test the following 
hypothesis this the new methodology that focused on specifi c party positions, thus measuring 
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Euroscepticism on a substantive basis: Political parties in the Netherlands have become more Eu-
rosceptic between 2002 and 2017. 
3. Methodology
For the purpose of this paper Euroscepticism will be calculated on the basis of the relative amo-
unt of concrete policy positions that indicate (1) preference towards approaching a policy area wit-
hin the national sphere rather than with EU-level cooperation (policy areas) or (2) preference to 
move away from the EU-level back to the national level (institutional change). Th e criteria for the 
selection of the specifi c policy positions from the content analysis are described in the metho-
dology section. 
In order to assess whether Dutch political parties have become more Eurosceptic over time, 
the focus should not only be on the negative support for European integration and the EU as 
such, but also on the positive assessments of membership to the EU and related benefi ts. Th is 
holds true especially when creating a scale of Euroscepticism. While much of the debate in terms 
of the support of parties towards the EU and European integration is on Eurosceptic parties, the 
debate on pro-EU parties (see Adam et al, 2016) is understudied, especially aft er the penetration 
of the Eurosceptic debate in EU studies.
Th is paper will look at the policy positions that refl ect a position on European integration 
or the EU of all the parties in the Dutch parliament over the period 2002 to 2017. Th e research 
design is a qualitative content analysis of the national election party manifestos of all the political 
parties represented in the Dutch upper chamber, the Tweede Kamer. For all the party statements 
related to the EU, the question that is asked is: “Does this mean that the party supports (or re-
jects) deeper and/or wider EU cooperation, and/or infl uence of the supranational institutions?” 
Important to note is that policies that refl ect an infl uence of the national parliament do not have 
to imply a decreased role of the EU, but rather a stronger control mechanism of the government’s 
actions. When political parties refer to the European Union in their party manifestos, these 
statements are not necessarily specifi c policy positions, where parties articulate what they think 
should be done with regards to issues relating to the EU. Most parties have general statements on 
the EU like, “As the Netherlands, we need a strong and eff ective Europe to protect our interests 
and strengthen our position” (CDA 2017: 34), or “Europe is struggling with itself and its ideals” 
(CU 2017: 87). Th ese are cases where there is an explicit reference to the European Union, yet 
without a specifi c policy position. 
Th e author agrees with Leconte (2010) and Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003) that the perception 
of a lack of European integration and/or democratic accountability being perceived as Euroscep-
ticism misses part of the point, namely that the most Europhile politicians may refer to such in-
suffi  ciencies. One of the oft -used statements of political parties regarding the European Union is 
the need to cut red tape, and to increase the transparency of the EU institutions, particularly the 
European Commission (for instance in the year 2017, 10 and 7 of the 13 parties in the Dutch par-
liament referred to these issues in their party manifestos, respectively). However, such issues of 
reform may not qualify as being Eurosceptic, if by Eurosceptic we specifi cally refer to widening/
deepening of integration and cooperation - as stated above. Invoking the subsidiarity principle is 
another such position. Th e same holds true when referring to the notion of a democratic defi cit 
in the EU - before the Maastricht Treaty the term was used in the overwhelmingly pro-European 
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sense, yet since then the Eurosceptics have come to use it as a political rhetoric against the EU 
(Leconte, 2010: 54-55). As such, these issues would need to be viewed within a specifi c context, 
and the general position regarding the EU of the party in question; which is out of the scope of 
the paper. 
Furthermore, other policy positions that will be omitted in the refl ections are those that 
relate to reforms of specifi c policies, like the need to reform the Common Agricultural Policy to 
be more environmentally sustainable, or the need to cut red tape. If a party is in favour of such a 
position, then that does not imply a Eurosceptic or pro-European position. Also, the party posi-
tion should not be an ideological or domestic policy position that is packaged into an issue that 
relates to the EU, like support for the free trade agreements between the EU and the US (TTIP), 
and the EU and Canada (CETA), or whether the EU should include human rights as a condition 
when signing association agreements with third countries. Such issues relate to party ideology 
and do not causally relate to support for deeper European cooperation.
Unambiguous policy positions are positions that refer to issue areas where more/less coo-
peration is desirable, like dealing with environmental issues, migration, economic stability, in-
novation, international crime, energy-related concerns, defence and foreign policy coordinati-
on. Another group of positions refers to integration: more/less competences to the European 
Commission or European Parliament, the creation of a Federal Union, more/less veto powers 
for member states, increased thresholds for transfer of sovereignty, decreasing the number of 
EU agencies, enlargement, and looking into, or having referendums on, exits from the EU or 
Eurozone.  
Yet another point to consider is the element of time and its consequences on the  evolution of 
the European Union. Global, regional and national political developments shape public opinion, 
party politics and, subsequently, the course and shape of European integration. Given that some 
policy issues were not relevant in 2002 but are salient in 2017, the majority of the weight of po-
sitioning should not be on the policy areas per sé, but rather on those issues that were the most 
salient at the time. In the specifi c case of the Netherlands, one fruitful way to do so is by analy-
sing those issues which are recurring in most party programmes in the respective election years. 
Th e above serves the purpose of limiting the amount of party positions that shall be conside-
red. A limitation of the current study might be that it excludes the diff erences in the perceptions 
and degrees of desired cooperation in the policy areas mentioned. Th is is in fact not necessarily 
a limitation, since the motivation to cooperate is the decisive factor in determining Euroscepti-
cism. 
For the purpose of this paper, the election years between 2002 and 2017 will be looked at - 
election years were 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012 and 2017. Th e election year 2002 was turbulent in 
Dutch politics. Th e assassination of Pim Fortuyn turned into a wave of support for his - leader-
less - party, and a government was formed that lasted for less than 3 months. It is however an in-
teresting year to look at when considering developments in the EU, since the process of draft ing 
a new EU Treaty had been initiated at the European Council meeting in December 2001, and the 
debate on the big 2004/7 EU enlargement was ongoing.3  
3 Th e author is aware that there was an election in the year 2003; however, all parties either added short 
updates of their 2002 election programmes, or did not publish any new documentation.
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Th e current study is in part based on Pellikaan and Louwerse’s confrontational approach to the 
measurement of policy positions, where “[t]he basic assumption of the method is that it is possible 
to capture policy positions of political parties by determining their positions on a small number 
of specifi c policy items on which, in principle, divergent positions can be taken” (2015, 198). Th is 
paper will depart from Pellikaan and Louwerse by focusing only on policy positions on European 
integration, in contrast to their study of 12 issue dimensions. Missing data in this paper is treated 
in the same way as Pellikaan and Louwerse treat it, namely that missing data gets a score of zero (0) 
(2015, 206). Th e lack of an exact positioning by parties of policy areas related to the EU need not 
necessarily imply a lack of issue salience of the EU. Since only a select number of statements on the 
EU in party manifestos refl ect a “Eurosceptic” position, if political parties choose to deliberately 
blur their position on these policy areas as a strategy to not unnecessarily distance the party from 
its voters (Rovny, 2013; Adam et al, 2016), this is not a suffi  cient qualifi cation to question the sali-
ence of the EU for this party. Th ese parties may devote more attention to the EU in general terms. 
4. Results
Figure 1 shows the amount of unambiguous policy positions that the diff erent political parties in the 
Netherlands have over time expressed in their party programmes for the general elections of 2002, 
2006, 2010, 2012 and 2017. Th ose occasions where political parties referred to a particular issue but 
did not express a clear position are excluded from this data set. Th e data are presented as percentages, 
where 100% means that all of the policy positions for that election cycle answered the following 
question in the affi  rmative: “Does this mean that the party supports (or rejects) deeper and/or wider 
EU cooperation for this policy area, and/or increased infl uence of the supranational institutions?”. 
Th e total amount of policy positions in the election cycles are shown in Table 2.
 
Figure 1: Degree of (1-euroscepticism) (%)
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Table 2







Th e hypothesis that the positions of political parties in the Netherlands have become more Euro-
sceptic between 2002 and 2017, is answered in the affi  rmative, but it has certain conditions to it. 
What cannot be read from the fi gures above are the explanations behind specifi c trends. 
From Figure 1 it is visible that the ratio of Eurosceptic versus non-Eurosceptic statements has 
increased over time (as visible by the decrease in the averages in the subsequent election cycles). 
Th is has to do more with an overall increase in the number of policy positions of Dutch parties 
that are against cooperation or favour institutional change that limits rather than extends the 
infl uence of the EU institutions. Th is however does not signify that the amount of positions that 
are favourable towards the EU have decreased. While there is no clear increasing trend in the 
amount of positions from one election cycle to the next, all the parties that were represented in 
parliament throughout the period 2002-2017 had a higher absolute amount of positive referen-
ces to the EU in 2017 than in 2002. As such, the total amount of positive policy positions increa-
sed, but what explains the decreasing ratio in the (1-Euroscepticism) variable is the increase in 
the amount of positions of parties that were for a decreased role of the EU (as such Eurosceptic).
One clear point of continuity over the years is the overwhelming support by all the parties, 
except for the hard-Eurosceptic PVV (the hard-Eurosceptic FvD joined parliament only aft er 
the last elections), to cooperate in those policy fi elds that are of an international dimension, like 
climate change, terrorism and international crime, economic and fi nancial (in)stability, migrati-
on movements and world political issues (Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Common 
Security and Defense Policy). 
Harryvan and Van der Harst (2017) identify three governmental “manifestations of Eurocri-
ticism” (4-6), the start of the lengthy campaigning for a decrease in the national contributions 
of the Netherlands to the EU (starting early 1990s), the focus on subsidiarity and thus a more 
critical position towards the transfer of competences away from the member state (starting in the 
early 2000s), and thirdly the further drive to hold back the transfer of competences in the Rutte 
I cabinet in 2010. Rutte I was a minority cabinet of a corporatist liberal party (VVD) and the 
Christian Democrats (CDA), with permanent parliamentary support by the far-right nationalist 
party PVV. Th e current qualitative content analysis fi nds a recurrence of these “manifestations 
of Eurocriticism” in a number of party programmes over the years.4 A recurring theme for an 
4 See the appendix for those specifi c policy positions in which at least half of the parties, who refer to it 
unambiguously, have a Eurocritical position.
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increased number of parties is the reference to a transfer of competences back to the member 
states. No less than 6 of the 13 parties in 2017 referred to this in their manifestos as compared to 
only 2 of 9 parties in 2002. Th ree policy positions are viewed critically by at least half of the par-
ties that explicitly refer to it - the aforementioned transfer of competences back to the member 
state, a decrease in the contributions of the Netherlands to the EU, and Federal Union. 
Th e debate on the decrease of contributions of the Netherlands is an ‘old’ position, in that 
the debate on this started already in the early 1990s, when the Netherlands was the largest per 
capita net contributor to the EU budget of all the member states (Harryvan and Hoekstra, 2013). 
Th e debate on a Federal Union, implying far-reaching supranationalism, has been held on the 
political level ever since the start of the EU project, and came under increasing scrutiny with the 
end of the permissive consensus of the public towards the EU since the early 1990s (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2008).
6. Conclusion
While political parties in the Netherlands continue to support deepened and widened coope-
ration on the EU-level on those issues that are widely considered as having an international 
dimension - like migration fl ows, economic and debt crises, terrorism and international crime, 
and the environment - this paper fi nds that there is an increase in the amount of references that 
political parties directly make ‘against’ the EU. In light of earlier fi ndings on the movements wit-
hin (Dutch) political parties (notably Vollaard and Voerman, 2015, and Harryvan and Hoekstra, 
2013), this result can be seen as a further support for the observation of increased Eurosceptic 
positions in the Netherlands over time. A similar fi nding on the state of party Euroscepticism 
in the Netherlands was reached, thereby using a diff erent methodology - a process called trian-
gulation.
Additionally, this paper presents a new way of measuring Euroscepticism, going beyond the 
current categorisations of Euroscepticism, thereby exploring the actual ratios of Eurosceptic po-
licy positions against those favouring more cooperation and deeper and/or wider integration. 
While this method of measuring Euroscepticism is time-consuming, building a database of the 
exact positions of political parties across the European Union could provide insightful lessons 
in history, comparative politics, and the (d)evolution of European integration. As such, future 
research, conducting elaborate content analyses of the party programmes in the European Uni-
on, would off er a comparative dimension to the study of Euroscepticism across time and space.  
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Appendix
Th is table shows the policy positions where at least half of the parties who explicitly stated a 
preference to have less EU-level cooperation on that issue or where European integration was 
perceived negatively.
2002 Nr of negative - positive positions
Decrease national contributions 1-0
EU army 3-1
Federal Union 3-3
Transfer of competences back to MSs 2-0
2006
Decrease national contributions 2-0
Federal Union 4-1
Tax harmonisation 1-0
Transfer of competences back to MSs 3-0
2010
Decrease national contributions 7-0
EU army 3-2
Federal Union 1-1
Transfer of competences back to MSs 3-0
2012
Decrease national contributions 4-0




Stop EU agency creation 1-0
Transfer of competences back to MSs 2-0
2017
Decrease national contributions 4-1
EU army 4-2
Federal Union 1-1
Greece to leave Euro 1-0
Greece out of Schengen 1-0
Healthcare 1-0
Leave Schengen 2-0
